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TYPICAL CYCLE PATTERNS
introduction
THE statistical record of business cycles, voluminous
as it is, is still too incomplete to afford a systematic
test of all the principal theories and the principal
causal factors suggested by them. If we wish to test
the theory of over-production in a literal form, the
figures for stocks of goods are not sufficiently com-
plete or systematic for the purpose; they merely
afford suggestions. If we shift to the theory of under-
consumption, figures of consumers' purchases are
even more fragmentary.1 If we go on to theories of
under-saving or over-saving, or the theory of discrep-
1Anadequate test of this theory would require other data also. But
figures of consumers' purchases, if not alone sufficient for the purpose,
are clearly necessary.
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ancies between saving and investment, we find that
real figures of savings are almost non-existent, since
the data on savings bank deposits represent too
small and too special a fraction of this flow to have
great significance, and issues of new securities af-
ford only indirect evidence. Data on the spending
of savings for actual goods are also not sufficiently
complete and detailed to be useful in checking any
theory that rests upon a discrepancy between this
very large flow and another about equally large.
Figures of production are far more satisfactory, as
are those on international trade and on banking,
though in the latter the difficulty is one of inter-
pretation, since credit issued for different purposes
has very different meanings. It may be supporting
a boom, or extending first aid to victims of a crisis.
Hence any suggestions as to the more significant
causal factors derived from the statistical records
must not be regarded as exhaustive; one must ex-
pect rather that other factors will be added by the
development of more complete records, if this de-
velopment can outrun the impatience of industrial
nations to do something decisive to remove or con-
trol the phenomenon under examination.
Another difficulty is that of establishing causal
importance in a bare record of a sequence of events
such as the one before us. Not only are no two
cycles exactly alike; no two are alike in all but one
probable causal factor; so that it is impossible to
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establish the causal effect of any one factor exactly
by the method of formal induction. And if it were
possible, we should have only a record of this factor
in connection with a particular combination of
other factors; with a different combination its effect
would in all probability be different. Hence the
scrutiny of the record, by itself, will yield sugges-
tions rather than proof.
Perhaps the chief evidence as to which are the
disturbing factors in the record is presented by two
characteristics of the series: their timing and their
relative amplitude of fluctuation. Series whose up-
and down-turns consistently precede those in other
series are suspect as having some causal significance,
if they are of such a character as to make this inter-
pretation rational. And series that consistently fluc-
tuate much more violently than the rest are similarly
suspect, on the same terms. In addition, factors
whose behavior is irregular are not to be ignored,
if there is any basis for judging their effect.
Indeed, a study of business cycles may be divided
into two inquiries: a search for the universal factors
and another search for the occasional ones. Or we
may search for the causes applicable to all cycles
and then search separately for the factors responsi-
ble for the mildness of some and the, severity of
others. In advance, itis impossible to tell which
inquiry is the more significant; but at any rate, the
second is not to be ignored.
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The Factor of Timing: Introduction 2
Instudying leads and lags, it is almost inevitable
to use the general 'reference cycle', or period of
expansion and contraction of general business con-
ditions, as a common standard in terms of which to
report the relative timing of the various series. But
it is also necessary to remember that this 'reference
cycle' is after all only a composite picture; and that
in all strictness the significant factor is the relation
of the timing of each series to that of all the other
specific series with which it may have some fairly
direct connection. A series with an unusually large
lead, however, with respect to the reference cycle,
by that fact must have a lead over most of the spe-
cific series that go to make it up.
In this study of timing one result which stands
out is that, of the series presenting the movements
in various forms of production, those whose timing
agree most closely with that of the 'general business'
cycle are, for the most part, the so-called 'basic in-.
dustries'—pig iron, steel ingots, coke, machine-tool
shipments and producers' goods in general. Produc-
tion of consumers' goods shows more variation from
2Indealing with leads and lags, the writer has, with one exception,
based his conclusions on the three-month periods marking the stages
of recession and of recovery already referred to(see pp. 8ff. above).
This was done in preference to using the highest and lowest single
months, chiefly because the latter procedure involves difficulties with
double peaks, and does not do justice to the difference between short,
sharp peaks and lower but longer ones.
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thegeneral cycle, while the movements of agricul-
tural production show little or no relation to it.
This may, of course, be a comment on the impor-
tance attached to these 'basic industries' in fixing the
dates of the general business cycle; but even so, the
conclusion is, not that these basic industries are
given undue weight, but rather that their fluctua-
tions are so much more pronounced than the aver-
age that they, with other series moving in sympathy
with them, tend to dominate those series whose tim-
ing is radically different. This conclusion is strength-
ened by the fact that they move in closer agreement
with each other than do other series. They• seem
justly to assume a place of central importance in the
general business cycle.
Timing: Construction
The largest and some of the most clearly prevail-
ing leads are found in the construction industry, as
exhibited in building permits issued and contracts
let. Their movements are followed, with minor dis-
crepancies, by the production of structural steel,
Portland cement, oak flooring, baths and lavatories—
in short, materials and products serving the con-
struction industry.
The average cycle pattern for construction con-
tracts awarded shows a clear lead of a quarter-cycle
at down-turns and a larger lead at up-turns. There
are, however, marked differences of behavior be-
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tween different cycles, and between different sec-
tions of the industry. Industrial construction shows
the most regular timing, most nearly synchronous
with the general business cycle, and the largest
amplitudes of fluctuation. It manifests a tendency
to lead on the up-turn but not on the down-turn.
Commercial construction also manifests no tendency
to lead on the down-turn but shows an average lead
of more than a quarter-cycle at the up-turn, of the
three general business cycles in which commercial
construction manifests a definite trough. In the last
two cycles there is no trough deserving the name,
one exhibiting almost continuous rise and the other
almost continuous decline. Commercial construction
is thus more irregular than industrial, showing less
conformity to the general business cycle, and also
has milder cyclical fluctuations. Public works and
utilities (recorded for two cycles only) manifest no
tendency to lead or lag.
Residential construction has the largest irregu-
larities, particularly in the last two cycles, combined
with a large average lead. In residential contracts
awarded (value, recorded for five cycles, 1915-31)
thereseems to be a clear tendency to an average lead
of a quarter-cycle, though with a considerable dis-
persion around this average. It is this tendency which
is mainly responsible for the tendency of total con-
struction to lead general business, and entirely re-
sponsible for the tendency to lead at the peak. In
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the last cycle the curve of residential construction
has no real peak, only a brief and slight interruption
of its downward swing. It shares with commercial
construction the responsibility for the peculiar be-
havior of the combined construction series in the
last two cycles, the first showing an almost uninter-
rupted rise and the second an almost uninterrupted
decline.
The grand resultant is a composite curve char-
acterized by considerable irregularity. The behavior
of total contracts awarded during the general busi-
ness cycles of 1912-14and1915-19isfairly regular,
leading the curve of general business by a few
months, and showing a rise in the final years which
appears to record mainly the effect of the War on
money values, rather than an increased physical
volume. In the next cycle, that of 1919-21, construc-
tion has a double peak, better described as a plateau
occupying the entire expansion and the down-turn
stage of general business, the subsequent up-turns
occurring mid-way of the general business contrac-
tion. The cycle of 1921-24 shows a mild peak or
plateau occupying the latter part of the general
business expansion, and a higher, briefer peak mid-
way of the general business contraction. Of the last
two cycles, 1924-27 and 1927-32, the former shows
a rise throughout and the latter a decline through-
out, both interrupted by a mild peak occurring at
the same time as the down-turn of general business.
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In the latter cycle, of course, these series do not show
a definitive end of the phase of contraction.
To sum up: in two cycles construction reaches its
peak some time before the peak in general business
activity; in one there is a double peak or plateau
extending over the entire business expansion; in
one a mild peak somewhat before the peak in gen-
eral business activity and a higher peak mid-way of
general business contraction; and in the last two
there are mild construction peaksthe peak of
general businessactivity,superimposed upon a
larger movement upward throughout the 1924-27
cycle and downward throughout the succeeding
cycle. Thus construction reached a major peak dur-
ing the very mild depression of general business
that separated the last two cycles. The peak of con-
struction and the trough of general business both
appeared in mid-winter of 1927-2 8(it must be re-
membered that these cyclical movements are reck-
oned after the seasonal fluctuation, with its pro-
nounced winter decline in construction, has been
eliminated). The unusual behavior of construction
at this time may have been responsible for the fact
that this depression of general business was so un-
usually mild. The typical pattern, barring the ex-
ceptional features of the last two cycles, shows a peak
or plateau somewhere in the expansion phase of
general business, and a lead of about a quarter-cycle
on the subsequent up-turn.
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Inthe total figures two features stand out. One
is the tendency to lead, which would be more plainly
evident if cyclical movements were measured as de-
partures from secular trends. The other is the ten-
year wave which dwarfs the three short-cycle move-
ments from 1921to1931.Thiswave manifests itself
in the fact that the various series of all sorts quite
typically have a descending trend in this present
cycle: a slight rise and a large drop; whereas they
typically showed the reverse in the two preceding
cycles: a large rise and a slight drop. Industrial con-
struction, however, appears to be dominated by the
short-cycle movements rather than by this ten-year
wave. The irregular or random forces (from the
standpoint of the short-cycle) would appear to have
acted mainly on branches of construction other
than industrial.
The behavior of production and sales of struc-
tural steel, Portland cement, oak flooring, baths and
lavatories is consistent with that of building con-
tracts, showing in general a considerable lead, and
larger activity on the up-swing of the general cycle
than on the down-swing. A tabulation of leads and
lags as compared with what seems in each case the
most relevant construction-series indicates a fairly
normal distribution, with more than one-third of
the down-turns and up-turns synchronous with those
of the relevant construction series, and lagsvery
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slightly more numerous than leads.8 A similar tabw
lation of leads and lags as compared with the gen-
eral business cycle (othitting the two last cycles as
abnormal) again shows more than one-third of the
cases synchronous while in nearly all the rest the
construction material leads. Again the tendency to
lead is clear. Incidentally, these construction mate-
rials suggest the ramified effects of building activity.
To sum up, the large lead in construction activity
suggests strongly that this industry has a peculiar
causal significance. The irregularities of its behavior
indicate that there are 'originating causes' at work,
mainly outside the field of industrial construction.
This last follows the timing of the general business
curve more closely and regularly, but the great in-
tensity of its fluctuations still indicates a peculiar
causal importance (to be discussed in the following
section). The lead it exhibits on the up-turn, though
not on the down-turn, is also highly significant. And
the peculiarities of the behavior of construction dur-
ing the last three cycles, taken together, suggest that
it may be one of the industries which, at times at
least, follows longer cycles than those of general busi-
ness and is only slightly modified by these shorter
business cycles; and that in any case the variations
Forexample, Portland cement was correlated with public works
and utilities, a}so with industrial construction; baths and lavatories
were correlated with residential construction;structural steel with
total construction.
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inits behavior from one general business cycle to
another may be one of the important influences
determining the differences between these cycles
themselves. It is worth noting also that residential
construction—which is in the class of consumption
goods—shows the largest and most frequent lead, as
well as the greatest irregularity, so that the evidence
of an originating causal role—so far as we can speak
of such a matter in this connection—is strongest for
this section of the industry.
This pattern of behavior is not difficult to ration-
alize on theoretical grounds. It is a phase of the
general principle of intensified fluctuations of de-
rived demand for durable goods. That is, demand
for new supplies of durable goods fluctuates more
intensely than demand for the current services these
durable goods render. This principle we shall en-
counter at several points in the following discussion
and it is therefore worth stating with some fullness.
The basic force at work can best be seen in a
simplified example.4 If there is a stock of ioo,ooo
units of some durable commodity with a life of
twenty years and a secular rate of increase of 4 per
4 The writer has developed this principle in Business Acceleration
and the Law of Demand, Journal of Political Economy, XXV, 2 17-35,
March, also in Economics of Overhead Costs(University of
Chicago Press, 1923), pp. 389-94. Cf. also criticism by Ragnar Frisch,
Capital Production and Consumer-Taking and subsequent discussion
with the writer: Journal of Political Economy, October, December,
1931, April, 1932.
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cent per year (figured in compound-interest fash-
ion), then to maintain that rate of increase for the
current year will require about 7,360 new units:
about 3,360 for replacing those built twenty years
previous and 4,000 to furnish the current year's in-
crease. The previous year's output, on the same
basis, would have been 7,077 units. Now if in the
current year the stock increases by 8 instead of 4 per
cent, current output will have to be 11,360, s&rhich
is 54percent above the 7,360 which we may call
'normal' for the year, and 6o per cent above the
previous year's output. On the other hand, if in the
current year the stock increases, but by 3.717 per
cent instead of 4 per cent, current output will not
increase over that of the previous year. If the stock
increases by a less amount, current output will de-
cline. If the stock is barely maintained, current out-
put will shrink to 3,360, which is 54 per cent below
normal and 521,4 per cent below that of the previous
year. If the stock is allowed to decrease 3.36 per cent
by failure to make replacements, current output
will shrink to zero. Evidently a change in the growth
of the stock, representing a change in the growth
of the rate of use, calls for a much more intense
change in the current production of the commodity.
If the commodity is shorter-lived, like an automo-
bile, and the clement of replacement is correspond-
ingly larger, the principle remains the same, but the
quantities are different. If we have a stock of ioo,ooo
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automobiles in the hands of users, with a life of seven
years and increasing at an annual rate of io per cent,
then normal production for the current year is
about 20,500; about 10,500 to replace those made
seven years previous, and 10,000 to provide for
normal increase. The previous year's normal produc-
tion would have been something over i8,6oo. Then
if the rate of increase of the stock rose to 20 per cent,
the current output would rise to 30,500, which is
49 per cent above normal and 64 per cent above the
previous year's output. If the rate of increase of the
stock declines from 10 to 8.1 per cent, increase of
current output will cease entirely. If the stock ceases
to increase, current output will fall to 10,500 which
is 49 per cent below normal and 44 per cent below
the previous year's output. If the stock decreases
10.5 per cent through the cessation of all replace-
ments, current output shrinks to zero. Here again
fluctuations in the movement of the stock give rise
to intensified fluctuations of current output, though
the intensification is less marked.
One of the most significant features of this rela-
tionship is that it is not necessary for the stock of
goods to decrease in order to bring about a decrease
of current output. A moderate decrease in the rate
of growth is sufficient.
The actual behavior of production as affected by
this principle is complicated by several other fac-
tors. One thing which is likely to happen is a tern-
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porary reduction in the rate of scrapping, because
old units are kept in service longer. This means
that the existing stock of goods suffers a decline in
average quality because the average age of the units
has increased. To the extent that retirements are
postponed in dull times or speeded up in active
times, the result is an even greater intensification
in the movements of current output corresponding
to given fluctuations in the number of units in
service.
By way of illustrating the operation of these fac-
tors, the production of automobiles decreased from
5,621,715in1929 to 1,431,494in1932, whilethe
numberof registrations, taken as an indication of
changes in number of cars in service (though slightly
overstating the absolute numbers) declined from
26,545,281 to Thus a decline of nearly
75percent in annual production corresponded to
a decline of onlylittle over 9 per cent in total
number in use. If figures were available showing
the number of cars which merely stood unlicensed
in the owners' garages or backyards, the total num-
ber might show no decrease at all, although produc-
tion had gone on at a rate far below a normal re-
placement basis in 1931and1932.
Furthermore,while retirements of cars from use,
as deduced from licenses taken out, did not actually
5SeeFacts and Figures of the Automobile Industry, 'q33, published
by the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce.
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decline during the depression years, they did fall far
behind the rates of production recorded seven years
previous, when the cars were being produced which
would normally have been retired during 1930-32.
During 1928 and 1929 the reverse was the case, re-
tirements exceeding the production of seven years
previous. Thus during the boom the average age of
cars decreased somewhat through a relative speed-
ing-up of retirements, while during the depression
average age increased through an opposite move-
ment. The same effect appears to a less extent in
comparing retirements for 1924 and 1925. The es
sentialfiguresare shown inthe accompanying
table 6
Anothercomplication arises because fluctuations
in demand for products or services are not instantly
followed by the precisely appropriate fluctuations
in stocks and current output of the durable goods
required as means to make the products or render
the services. There are lags, errors of estimate and
competitive duplications of apparent demand, which
play a role in the actual outcome, and the changes
in demand are themselves complex, partly causes
and partly results. They are partly matters of chang-
6Factsand Figures of the Automobile industry, '933. An accurate
estimate of normal retirements should, of course, be based on a
distributed lag, rather than on production in one year only. This
would not, however, change the essential showing on the point at
issue, the chief effect being to make the comparison of retirements
in 1924 and 1925 less striking.
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PRODUCTION AND SCRAPPING OF AUTOMOBILES
Excess or deficiency
Production Total of scrappings.
for domesticscrapped or Cf. production








1924 3,310,018 1,151,381 —642,411
1925 3,837,841 1,670,337 +546,822
1926 3,908,854 1,824,230 —26,752
1927 2,935,577 2,110,214
1928 3,776,583 2,516,868 +960,884
1929 4,625,354 2,772,838 +355,251
1930 2,950,980 2,884,228 —915,560
193L 2,148,917 2,904,262 * —405,756
1932 1,251,205 2,900,000 —937,841
ing taste, but their cyclical fluctuations are mainly
dependent on fluctuations in incomes, which in turn
reflect fluctuations in productive activity, thus com-
pleting a vicious circle. The sensitiveness of differ-
ent commodities to such changes in income depends
partly on their durability and partly on the degree
to which they represent necessities or luxuries.
Building construction, for example,is both a
necessity and a luxury; but as there are always suf-
ficient buildings to house the population in some
fashion, current additions are concerned mainly with
*Thecompilers note that these figures may include cars merely
stored.
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the relative luxury element of more adequate and
modern accommodations. And for the same reason
the time when any given house-dweller enlarges his
accommodations is peculiarly optional, liable to epi-
demics of postponement, or to concentrations which
bring about particularly active seasons of building.
A dwelling is also customarily rented or bought on
credit; consequently the ability to pay an additional
$50 for rent this month, together with confidence
in the continuation of this happy state, can give rise
to a demand involving an immediate expenditure
of, let us say, $6,ooo in construction. In fact, the
increase in construction may be more than this, if
we take into account the possibility of building in
excess of demand, causing some of the older accom-
modations to stand vacant and making the total
amount of additional investment in housing con-
struction perhaps materially larger than the increase
in capital cost or value of accommodations which
tenants are actually occupying and paying rent on.
On the other hand, if there is at the moment an
over-supply left from a recession immediately pre-
ceding, the first increase in demand may not ab-
solutely necessitate any new building in order to
satisfy it. However, even in such an event, the exist-
ing buildings will not be entirely up to date, and
the demand for housing of this character will call
for some new construction. It will also stimulate
work of repair and remodelling as well as specula-
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tive building in advance of demand, both of which
tend to fall behind their normal condition in a de-
pression. Moreover, the areas in which the recovery
of demand is strongest are not likely to coincide
exactly with those in which previous activity has
left the largest over-supplies. Thus a revival of de-
mand is likely to produce a considerable immediate
effect on construction work, even though there may
be in the aggregate a considerable amount of vacant
space, and even though .the full effect of the revival
may not be felt until this over-supply has been con-
siderably reduced.
Thus a given increase or decrease in consumer-
demand for housing, measured by the income the
consumer stands ready to devote currently to this
purpose, naturally results under ordinary conditions
in a much larger increase or decrease in volume of
expenditures on the production of the goods that
are to satisfy that demand. This outcome may, of
course, be modified if reviving demand finds a con-
siderable surplus already on hand. It naturally re-
quires, further, that the construction industry shall
have sources of funds to carry on the work: funds
whose increase or decrease is not limited by the
movements of consumers' income. This requisite is
supplied by an elastic credit system. Easy credit,
combined with an optimistic and speculative spirit,
may tend to push expansion beyond its logical pro-
portions as dictated by actual demand.
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Finally,as partial explanation of the lead in con-
struction work, we should note that the demand for
construction in excess of replacements is logically
the heaviest, not when consumers' incomes are the
largest, but somewhere near the time when they are
increasing fastest. Thus a lead of approximately a
quarter-cycle in construction work, as compared
with the general course of consumers' incomes, is
logical even if construction does not anticipate the
growth of demand but merely synchronizes with it.
Even if it really lags a trifle behind its logical tim-
ing, it can still show a substantial lead in its actual
peaks and troughs. Thus a boom in construction
may be at one and the same time a result of recov-
ery in consumers' incomes from a low point and a
cause of further recovery through the increased
spending power arising from the increased volume
of work done. This does not preclude, of course, the
possibility of increased construction work being
undertaken as a result of optimism and a general
speculative spirit, giving rise to a greater readiness
to build ahead of current requirements. The same
considerations apply, in the reverse direction, to the
process of recession.
This principle, as already noted, is a general one
applying, mutatis mutandis, to all durable goods
and to capital equipment. In the latter case, how-
ever, another step is involved. An increase in output
of consumers' goods has, in addition to the work of
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making them, a further effect in the shape of a de-
mand for more capital equipment, if existing equip-
ment is not in every way adequate. This demand
for capital equipment fluctuates more intensely than
the output of the goods it serves to produce; but the
total amount involved is likely to be much smaller;
the average annual expenditures for replacement
and extension of capital equipment are likely to be
not more than, for example, io to 20 per cent of the
annual output of the goods they serve to make.7 A
change from a3 to a6 per cent annual increase in
the output of the commodity might cause as much
as a 40 or 50 per cent increase in the smaller figure
representing the requirements for production of
capital equipment, and a change from a 6 to a3 per
cent annual increase in the commodity might cause
a corresponding decline in the requirements for out-
put of durable means of production. In the case of
capital equipment, also,the existence of excess
capacity at the moment when revival begins is likely
to have more effect in retarding the revival of the
derived demand than in the case of residential con-
struction. Equipment can often produce up-to-date
goods even though it is not itself completely up to
date, or can do so with minor changes. Production
of goods entering into general capital equipment, as
7Theprecise figure is not essential. The ratio between total output
of capital goods and consumers' goods clearlyfalls between these
limits.
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we shall see, shows the phenomenon of intensified
fluctuation but not the large lead that characterizes
construction work.
A further and very significant feature of this prin-
ciple is that it does not require, to bring it into
operation, that the original movements of ultimate
consumers' demand shall be actual alternations of
rise and fall. Fluctuations in the rate of growth are
sufficient to start the process of intensification. These
may then cause absolute rises and falls in the work
of supplying the demand, or of supplying the dur-
able equipment needed. And these in turn natu-
rally bring about absolute rises and falls in total con-
sumers' purchasing power, with resulting rises and
falls in the actual observed demand for commodities
in general. Thus this principle is of peculiar strategic
importance in explaining how alternate rises and
falls can be generated out of tendencies whose
original form and character need not contain any
positive shift from upward to downward movements.
It may also be of some help in explaining the dura-
tion of the swings, in view of the time required for
equipment to catch up with growing demand, or for
demand to catch• up with equipment. This matter
of duration will be left for further study, when we
shall be in a position to build this principle, as one
element, into a more rounded theory. It does not
in itself suffice to explain all the observed move-
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ments, and its action is clearly modified by other
factors.
Timing: Durable Luxury Goods
Another class of goods exhibiting some lead as
compared to the general business cycle is that of
durable luxury goods. For the purpose in hand this
group may be broadened to include goods which
may not in themselves be clearly luxuries, but which
are of such a character that the buying of a new one
at a given time to replace an old one which could
be made to serve longer might fairly be classed as a
luxury purchase in a considerable proportion of
cases. The dominant commodity of this class is pas-
senger automobiles, for the production of which
monthly data are available. Some slight indications,
however, point to the conclusion that fur coats and
some other goods of this class behave in a. somewhat
similar way. However, not all these other commodi-
ties are bought on the installment plan to the ex-
tent that automobiles are, and hence effective de-
mand is not so free to expand beyond present
realized income. A given increase in consumers' cur-
rent willingness to pay does not have the opportunity
to cause to the same degree an intensified increase
in gross production and sales of the goods them-
selves.
Passenger automobiles, like houses, are both a
luxury and a necessity, though the luxury element
[44TYPICAL CYCLE PATTERNS
is presumably larger. The high-priced car is clearly
a luxury; but so also are many replacements of
moderate-priced cars, when made earlier than neces-
sary. One would normally expect hard times to bring
about a shift of demand from higher-priced to
cheaper cars, coupled with a general postponing of
replacements and new purchases. The purchase of a
car is postponable; probably to a greater degree even
than the provision of housing space. Most new cars
are bought to replace used cars which still have a con-
siderable amount of wear left in them. And if the car
is a first purchase, the owner could usually get on a
while longer as he had previously, without a car,
Furthermore, the credit system of purchase may
bring it about that a given increase in consumers'
monthly income devoted to this purpose can furnish
the basis for a much larger immediate increase in
effective demand for the product. This may ramify
into a further increase in consumers' incomes before
the original purchaser has liquidated his original
obligation. If demand were steady, of course, the
monthly flow of income into the payment of install-
ments due would balance the monthly volume of
new sales; but any fluctuation brings about a dis-
crepancy, and the essence of this problem is fluctua-
tions, especially the way in which initial fluctuations
—which may arise from an indefinite variety of
causes—produce cumulative effects which may bring
about consistently repeated cycles of general busi-
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ness activity. If the volume of installment credit is
increasing, purchases are exceeding the volume of
income currently absorbed by them; and vice versa,
when outstanding installment credit is being liqui-
dated. And either condition tends to give rise to a
self-reinforcing movement. Purchases in excess of
income tend to increase income somewhere in the
economic system, via increasing production, while
if purchases fall short of income, this tends to reduce
income somcwhere in the system by reducing pro-
duction.
In any case, production and sales of passenger
automobiles show not only fluctuations decidedly
more intense than the average, but also a decided
lead as compared with the general business cycle.
rrhe average lead ismonths at the peak and 3.3
months at the trough, but in one cycle out of four
recorded there is a lag of 7 months at the peak.
Trucks show still more violent fluctuations and a
decidedly smaller lead, especially at the peak. Here
the prior impulse seems to come from consumers
goods.
The principle of a derived demand dependent on
the rate of growth of the primary demand applies
here as in housing, though to a less extent, since
the stabilizing element of need for replacements is
a larger part of the picture. Automobiles, being
shorter-lived than houses, come that much nearer
the type of currently consumed goods, and the ele-
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mentsof lead, and of intensification of fluctuations,
would therefore both logically be less marked.
Timing: Consumers' Goods in General
Evidences of leads and lags as between consumers'
and producers' goods in general are probably too
slight to support conclusions as to definitely estab-
lished patterns of behavior; but they do point in
certain directions. The Standard Statistics Corpora-
tion's index of general industrial production shows
a lead at the down-turn in two out of five cycles,
as compared with the general business cycle, and a
lead at the up-turn, also in two cycles out of five,
while the various samples of retail sales point, on
the whole, to a slight tendency to lag. Wholesale
trade, with some irregularities, seems on the whole
to move a trifle more promptly than retail trade;
while the volume of production of consumers' goods
shows some indications of moving more promptly
than either wholesale trade or the production of
producers' goods. It exhibits a clear lead of several
months in the series compiled by Dr. Leong and
this is quite consistent from cycle to cycle.8 To re-
peat, these indications are too slight and character-
ized by too many irregularities to afford a basis for
definitive conclusions.
8"A Comparative Study of the Indexes of Production," Journal
of the American Statistical Association, September, 1932, pp. 256-69,
for a published version of this study, which version is not, however,
put into the forz'.i of 'reference cycles' and 'specific cycles'.
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These observations, as far as they go, tend to the
conclusion that general consumer demand does not
lead, but follows the movements in production of
consumers' goods—that it moves up or down mainly
because changes in the rate of production have in-
creased or decreased the current purchasing power
of the workers. This would leave the causes of the
movements of production stillto be explained.
There is also clear indication that the relations of
retail to wholesale trade, and of wholesale trade to
production of the goods dealt in, are affected by
fluctuations in dealers' stocks, and that dealers begin
to go cautiously before the actual down-turn of con-
sumers' buying. This is adequate to explain the lead
shown by production of consumers' goods; and
would also tend logically to make production fluc-
tuate somewhat more than retail sales. But in view
of the irregularities in the series, the inference that
this happens in every cycle would be, to say the least,
premature.
Production of producers' goods might logically
show a similar lead but does not. This may be taken
to indicate that the tendency to lead is neutralized
by the lag due to the time required to finance and
carry through capital expansions, and to carry out-
put to completion.
It seems clear that we have at least two forces at
work at the same time, playing into each other's
hands, so to speak, and modifying or reinforcing each
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other's action. Consumers' buying power depends
•on the rate of production: this is an ever-present and
dominant factor from which there is no escape.
Movements of dealers' stocks are less certain and
regular. They may strengthen this major force or
may partly neutralize it, but on the whole it seems
probable that their effect tends to increase dis-
turbances. When dealers buy faster than they sell,
production tends to move faster than retail sales,
and this is likely to mean that people are receiving
more income than they are spending, and can
promptly increase their expenditures, with cumula-
tive effects.
Neither the records of consumers' income nor
those of retail purchases are sufficiently complete to
make possible a conclusion as to whether either
leads the other. Movements of industrial payrolls
seem to synchronize quite closely with those of re-
tail sales. Industrial payrolls may be presumed to
be more prompt in their movements than salaries
or interest and dividend disbursements; and on this
ground it might be presumed that total consumers'
income lags somewhat behind the movements of
retail sales, rather than leading them. But this would
be conjecture, rather than a definitely indicated con-
clusion. Expenditure of income from speculative
dealings in securities might well reverse it. Verifica-
tion must await more complete figures. Of the fig-
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ures available, many cover too few cycles to be very
significant.
Timing: industrial Production and Prices, Em ploy-
ment and Payrolls
Physical production of consumers' goods appears
to reach its peaks and troughs ahead of the corre-
sponding movements of prices. Producers' goods do
not exhibit this phenomenon in unmistakable form,
but they have another characteristic which bears a
close family relationship to a lead. Physical produc-
tion has its most rapid increase in the first part of
the up-swing, the rate slowing down before the
peak is reached, while the financial volume of pro-
duction is swollen by rising prices at a fairly uni-
form rate throughout the rise. Not all producers
goods show this phenomenon; bituminous coal pro-
duction increases more rapidly in the final phases of
the up-swing, anthracite coal shows an even rate of
increase throughout, and coke shows only a mildly
greater rise in the early phases of the up-turn than
in the later. Zinc shows an even rate of increase, lead
behaves rather ambiguously, while oak flooring,
lavatories and baths show a lead at peak and trough
rather than any changes in the rates of increase or
decrease during expansion or contraction. Pig iron
production (observed fori3cycles), steel ingots (3
cycles), copper (8 cycles), Portland cement (3 cy-
cles), and machine-tool shipments specificcycles
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covering5 reference cycles) all show a more rapid
increase in the earlier stages of the expansion period.
Fabricated structural steel shows both a lead and
a more rapid increase in the early stages of the ex-
pansion period. The general curve of industrial pro-
duction also shows a definite tendency toward a
greater rise in the early stages of the expansion
period.
Figures of factory employment seem to show a
similar tendency toward greater increase in the early
phases of the expansion in the average cycle pattern
except for the Federal Reserve Board's series, cover-
ing only three cycles. But this behavior is not con-
sistent from cycle to cycle, and hence cannot be re-
garded as a well-established feature of the typical
cycle. One might anticipate a less marked tendency
in this direction in these employment series, pre-
sumably because they include consumers' goods.
Payrolls, on the other hand, show on the whole the
opposite tendency; thatis, they increase slightly
more rapidly in the later stages of expansion, and
decrease slightly more rapidly in the later stages of
contraction. These tendencies do not appear in all
cases. But in the New York State factory employment
and payroll indexes, where the figures are presum-
ably comparable, covering the same four cycles, em-
ployment shows a large and definite tendency to rise
more rapidly in the early phases of expansion, and
payrolls a small but definite tendency to rise more
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rapidly in the later phases of expansion, indicating
probably a considerable lag in the response of wage
rates. This is complicated, however, by the factor
of part-time and over-time. A more widespread
policy of splitting up employment by shortened
work-days in dull times might alter the character of
this curve. Numbers employed would be prevented
from falling so low in mid-depression; and hence
would naturally not rise so steeply in the early stages
of expansion. Thus the shape of the curve might be
reversed. But this policy does not seem to have been
carried far enough to transform the curve, in the
recorded cycles.
This behavior of payrolls sheds some light on the
theory that depressions are due to a failure of indus-
try to increase its distribution of incomes as fast as
its output of consumers' goods. Apparently there is
such a discrepancy during the up-swing of the busi-
ness cycle, but itis on the whole slightly greater
during the early part of the rise than during the
later part. If this is an important factor in bringing
on the recession it must be delayed in its action,
being temporarily neutralized perhaps by expansion
of stocks and perhaps by expansion of credit, so that
its effect comes to a head when these neutralizing
factors have exhausted themselves.
The question arises: do these facts indicate that
producers' goods have greater initiatory importance
than consumers goods, since it is in producers goods
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thata preliminary tapering-off of rates of growth
manifests itself before the general recession? The
inference seems natural, but against it stands the
fact that this tapering-off is on the average slight,
and the further fact that it does not affect payrolls
and hence involves no corresponding tapering-off of
personal incomes. Nor does it govern the movement
of prices. It is an interesting symptom, but the evi-
dence at hand does not prove that it is in itself an
important causal factor in the typical cycle pattern.
In this respect the lead in physical production of
consumers' goods is probably more significant. But
it does seem significant that, for a given class of
goods, it is at the stage farther removed from the
consumer that the initiatory movement takes place—
that is, at the stage of production rather than retail
selling—if the available figures are representative.
Stocks of Goods
The story told by stocks of goods is decidedly con-
fused. In a general way, those nearer the consumer
tend toward a positive correlation, rising as business
rises and falling as business falls, while those nearer
the source of production show the opposite tendency.
In the first group may be named department store
stocks, cotton at mills (with a large lag) and steel
sheets, while in the second group are petroleum,
cement, iron at furnaces, sugar and refined copper.
The line of division is none too clear, and some
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stocks follow a more complicated pattern. Cotton in
warehouses fluctuates far more than cotton at mills,
and as compared with the latter may about equally
well be regarded as an inverse cycle with a large lead
or a positive cycle with an equally large lag. As com-
pared with cotton consumption, cotton in ware-
houses shows an inverse cycle with a definite lead.
The inverse cycle is natural, since the growing of
cotton does not follow the cycles of manufacturing
activity that govern its consumption; active
manufacturing tends to draw down the stocks. The
apparent lead may point to a delayed reaction of
manufacturing activity on cotton growing. A depres-
sion may lead to reduced cotton-planting which
would not take effect, on the crop until near the peak
of the next expansion.
In the cycle culminating in 1929, stocks of goods
seemed on the whole to show positive cycles, indi-
cating a behavior tending to intensify fluctuations
of consumers' demand in the process of passing them
on to the producers of goods and materials. That is,
in the boom, producers were working not only to
supply an active consumer demand, but to increase
stocks also. This may further indicate an unusual
piling-up of unsalable stocks in the prosperity phase
of the cycle: in other words, literal 'over-production'
such as is not commonly found. If this behavior were
more marked in this most recent cycle than in pre-
vious cycles, this fact would constitute one factor
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contributing to its unusual violence and persistence.
Stocks which show a negative correlation would seem
to have the opposite effect: that is, they would seem
to be used to make ultimate production more stable
than volume of consumers' purchases. They would
indicate that producers work to stock when demand
is slack and so maintain employment. In few in-
stances do stocks appear to be so handled as to pro-
duce a genuine stabilizing effect of this sort for an
industry as a whole, whatever single enterprises may
do. The movements of stocks thus seem to have, on
the whole, an unstabilizing influence, tending to
intensify fluctuations of business activity. This is an
influence responding to business moods and suscepti-
ble of control by business policy, not wholly gov-
erned by physical forces. But the volume of
stocks, at those points where they show a positive
correlation with production, is typically not large;
so that there may well be doubt whether their fluc-
tuations, when compared with the annual output,
produce a decided effect on the typical business
cycle.
Some effect there probably is, but the data do not
suffice for an estimate of its importance in quanti-
tative terms. Statistics on stocks need to be fuller and
especially to be more differentiated, so as to show
separately stocks of materials in the hands of those
who are waiting to sell them, and in the hands of
those who have bought them and are waiting to use
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them in further production; also stocks of inter-
mediate products and finished goods classified on
similar principles, distinguishing, so far as possible,
finished products in the hands of manufacturers,
wholesalers and retailers. If possible, a line should
be drawn between stocks whose amount registers a
willingness to buy and those whose amount reflects
inability to sell. The 'consumer's inventory' of dur-
able goods is not to be ignored but will be difficult
to reach statistically.
Timing: Dealings in Securities
The stock market is generally credited with being
one of the leading forces of disturbance, and if prior-
ity of movement is the criterion the evidence of its
complicity is strong. In this field data are available
for system4tic analysis of a larger number of cycles
than is possible for many other classes of data, and
the type of behavior indicated may be regarded as
correspondingly well established. It is a pattern with
considerable diversities of timing; but not sufficient
to destroy the well-marked type-form.
Volume of sales of stocks exhibits, on the average,
about a quarter-cycle lead as compared with the
general business cycle. This means that on the aver-
age sales reach their maximum mid-way in the up-
swing of the general cycle; but in point of fact, this
peak sometimes occurs near the beginning of the
general up-swing, sometimes near the end, and in
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1929itoccurred a few months after the down-turn
of general business. This last, however, was excep-
tional behavior, characterizing a very exceptional
cycle. Dealings in bonds show an evengreater lead.°
Prices of securities lag behind volumes of sales,
but lead as compared with the general business cy-
cle. Prices of preferred stocks and of bonds (the
latter taken as the inverse of bond yields) show ap-
proximately a quarter-cycle lead; those of common
stocks a smaller lead. In other words, the volume of
sales runs high during the boom that carries prices
up to their top level. The lag of common stocks as
compared with bonds records the well-known shift
from the less speculative to the more speculative
securities as the boom proceeds, and the return to
more conservative issues as depression deepens.
The large lead exhibited by dealings in stocks
places them in a class with construction and the
various special series directly related to it. There is,
in particular, a rather remarkable and suggestive
similarity between the average cycle pattern for sales
of stocks and of fabricated structural steel. In both
cases there is a lead of about a quarter-cycle as com-
Thisseries may also be represented as an inverse cycle with a short
lag, though this would tend to obscure the relationship between the
movements of bond and stock sales. In the separate cycles the typical
behavior (about one-third of total cases) is a lead of one cycle-stage in
bond sales as compared with stocks(each cycle being divided into
eight stages). About an equal number of cases show a larger lead, and
almost none show an unmistakable lag.
57]STRATEGIc FACTORS IN BUSINESS CYCLES
pared to the general business cycle. In both cases the
peak regularly comes at some time during the up-
swing of general business, but at different times in
different cycles, with the result that the composite
picture (the average cycle pattern) shows a plateau
instead of a peak. In both cases the trough comes,
on the average, about midway of the down-swing of
general business. And in both cases there is one cycle
showing an exceptional behavior. In the 1921-24
cycle fabricated structural steel shows a double peak,
the higher one occurring midway of the down-swing
of general business. The inference is that special
conditions during our immediate post-War recon-
struction lent greater persistence to the upward
movement, much as special conditions in 1927-29
prolonged the stock market boom past the peak of
general business, contrary to the usual behavior of
stock exchange trading. If priority of sequence is
valid evidence of causal responsibility, the case
against stock speculation is strong.
The rationale of the connection between stock
speculation and the general business cycle may seem
self-evident, but it is not utterly simple. Stock specu-
lation, like other things, may appear as both cause
and effect. And for at least one essential feature of
the story factual evidence is badly needed. A revival
in the securities markets has been construed as a
direct result of business depression, in that business
has so little need or productive use for funds that
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they flow into the market for securities already out-
standing—first favoring the• least speculative issues,
as befits the mood of the moment. Money at such
times is cheap. This condition implies that savings
are in excess of investment, in the Keynes termi-
nology. This is not because savings have increased,
but because investment has fallen off so much more
sharply.
The upward movement of securities tends, of
course, toward revival of business confidence, and is
in turn stimulated further by such a revival. As it
continues, it produces several effects. The strength-
ening market makes the issuance of new securities
more attractive, at the same time that reviving con-
fidence and business activity increases the desire and
need of corporations to obtain increased capital by
new issues. Possibly the time this process requires
may be one reason why the forces of supply and de-
mand in this case, instead of working toward an
equilibrium, operate with an initial inertia and a
final momentum that regularly bring about over-
swings.
The growing speculative demand for securities
operates with borrowed funds to a far larger extent
than the original conservative demand for the less
speculative securities. It is the stock-speculator who
deals on margin more than the bond-investor. Thus
the demand for securities is one of the growing group
of demands which tends to outrun the volume of
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funds taken currently for the purpose from the per-
sonal incomes of the purchasers. Business and the
stock market are now competing for funds, and
money rates rise, but the profits of a rising stock
market are so attractive that the rising money rates
do not promptly check the speculative demand,
though ultimately they may help to do so if the
movement is of the ordinary sort and has not gone
beyond the control of the forces of reason as did the
boom of 1928-29.Call money rates seem to be high-
est typically after the peak of stock prices and on the
decline, and often register the urgency of threatened
speculators struggling to hold on.
To use the concepts employed by Keynes, a rising
stock market is initiated in a period in which savings
almost certainly exceed investment: the same condi-
tion that, in his theory, brings about a low general
price level.10 And the reaction occurs at a time when
investments presumably exceed savings: the condi-
tion which, according to the Keynes theory, brings
about high general prices. This latter discrepancy is
probably intensified by the use of some part of the
stock market profits to purchase consumers' goods;
though there are no data to test whether such a
movement exists, or how great it may be.
The behavior of the stock market in the last cycle
10Seepp.88, gi fordiscussion of the probabilities as to the relative
behavior of savings and investment. The writer's conclusion on this
point does not rest on statistical evidences, for he has found no adequate
evidence bearing on the question.
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was out of the ordinary in that the stock market
boom went to fantastic and irrational heights in
1929,andcontinued extraordinarily long. Instead of
beginning to subside well before the general busi-
ness peak, it continued upward, tending presumably
to reinforce the peak of general business, and did
not reach its peak until several months after signs
of a down-turn in general business were recorded.
Thus, so far as speculation is a causal factor, it did
its utmost to make the last cycle unusually violent.
Timing: Agricultural Production and Prices
The timing of agricultural activity is markedly
different from that of industry and trade; and while
it shows no regular leads or lags it should be treated
in connection with the general subject of timing,
especially as various theories have traced the origins
of the business cycle to agricultural fluctuations.
Agriculture appears to have its own cycles, whose
timing has no clear or regular relation to the cycles
of general business. This is true whether we con-
sider physical production, prices at the farm, or the
product of the two, which may be taken to measure
the total purchasing power which agriculture gen-
erates and has to offer in the general market. Agri-
culture sometimes moves in harmony with the
general business cycle, sometimes in the reverse di-
rection and sometimes in quite an unrelated way.
One writer has added a third element to the analysis
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by calculating the total purchasing power of agri-
culture in terms of non-agricultural products; and
with the help of this quantity has attempted to estab-
lish an Agricultural Theory of Business Cycles.'1
But the correlations remain fragmentary and un-
convincing.
This does not mean that agriculture has no effect
on the business cycle, or no responsibility for its oc-
currence; far from it. It simply means that agricul-
ture is not a regularly acting force, tending typically
and regularly to help initiate the recovery, or stimu-
late the revival, or in any other waytoplay habit-
ually the same role in at least a predominant number
of cycles.
But a theory of business cycles must be concerned
not merely with forces arising within the cycle itself,
or in regular timing with it, but also with forces
arising outside the regular course
of arandom character in respect
of timing relative to the phenomenon we are study-
ing at present. We live in an economy exposed to
such 'random' forces; and one in which many kinds
of disturbance tend not to be self-limiting at once,
but to act in a cumulative and self-reinforcing way
for a considerable time and until the movement has
gone so far that a return swing naturally follows.
Without this characteristic of our economic system,
11Seean article under that title by M. D. Anderson, American Eco-
nomic Review, September, 1931,pp.
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there would in all probability be no cycles, but
merely random fluctuations. If, being what it is, the
system were exposed to no 'external' or 'random' dis-
turbances, it might in time a state of equilib-
rium in which again there would be no business
cycles. This last is an unprovable conjecture; but
whether true or not, the cycle as we know it is the
resultant of the combination of random disturbances
and an economic system which transmits their effects
cumulatively. There may also be forces which do not
fit well into this twofold classification; but in any
case, both the 'random' and the strictly cyclical forces
are to be regarded as of the essence of the actual
phenomenon. The random forces are not to be dis-
regarded merely because there is no discernible cor-
relation between their timing and that of the busi-
ness cycle itself.
They may, indeed, include those causes which
have the most obvious claim to be regarded as orig-
inative in character; though this means little more
than that they originate outside the endless circle of
causes and effects set in motion by the business cycle
itself. They are presumably originative only from
the standpoint of our somewhat arbitrarily delimited
problem. In their own nature they are no more ab-
original than any other forces we can discover—they
in turn have their causes.
There are perhaps two main ways in which agri-
cultural fluctuations may logically be supposed to
63]STRATEGIC FACTORS IN BUSINESS CYCLES
influence the general course of business. One is that
plentiful and cheap raw products are a stimulus to
the activity, or at least to the profitableness, of the
industries using them. Among the relationships of
this sort which could be traced are those between
wheat and flour milling, meat animals and slaughter-
ing and meat packing, wool and woolen manufac-
turing, hides and leather products, cotton and cot-
ton textiles. However, the cyclical fluctuations of
factory employment in food products are so very
slight that apparently the total disturbing influence
that can be traced to agriculture in this branch off
manufacturing, at least, is of superficially negligible
magnitude. It is, of course, conceivable that outside
disturbances of tiny magnitude are all that is re-
quired by the type of business cycle theory indicated
above.
The other way in which agriculture would logi-
cally be expected to influence general industrial and
commercial activity is by means of the greater or less
purchasing power that it throws into the market for
consumers' goods and farm equipment. The effects
of this element in the total flow of purchasing power
are not easy to isolate. Production and sales of farm
equipment might be segregated, and general retail
sales in rural districts would throw light on the mat-
ter. Mail-order sales, supposed to go largely to farm-
ers, are apparently more influenced by the general
businesscyclethan by agriculturalconditions,
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though analysis of these sales by districts might re-
veal a more positive dependence on the prosperity
of the farmer. In any case, this theory of the effect
of agricultural purchasing power is somewhat dis-
counted by the possibility that the increase in farm-
ers' purchasing power is partly at the expense of
that of other groups. This is especially probable so
far as farmers gain through increased prices of their
products. Agricultural prosperity is likely, however,
to increase the power of farmers to buy equipment
on credit without subtracting an equal amount from
the corresponding power of other groups. And we
must remember that small impulses of this sort may
still be important. To sum up: the influence of agri-
culture on general business is not traced in the data
so far analyzed but may be susceptible of some de-
gree of tracing by additional studies.
Timing: Foreign Trade
Foreign trade in relation to American business
cycles contains elements of both cause and effect.
Our imports respond quite closely to our domestic
business cycles. Increased industrial activity here
augments demand for raw materials from abroad,
while the resulting prosperity enhances our buying
power, part of which flows to imported products.
Capital funds might naturally be expected to flow
increasingly to this country when it is in a business
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boom, thus balancing and making- possible an in-
crease of commodity imports, relative to exports.
Exports are subject to a complex of forces arising
both here and abroad and affecting different prod-
ucts differently. However, as might be expected,
there is a considerable degree of general correspond-
ence between the movements of our exports and the
course of general business cycles in the importing
countries. These cycles are, as is well known, longer
than ours and differently timed. Though major dis-
turbances affect the entire industrial world to a con-
siderable extent, still, seldom or never are all the
main courftries to which we export simultaneously
in the same stage of their business cycles as we are
in ours. And some of our largest exports are of a
sort to be affected by our own agricultural produc-
tiveness as well as by changes in foreign demand.
Hence it is natural that exports, while showing some
slight correspondence with our business cycles, show
a still larger measure of independent action.
Fluctuations in export demand, as distinct from
fluctuations due to larger or smaller supplies of ex-
portable products in this country, are an element in
stimulating or depressing domestic production and
trade: And they are, to a considerable extent, among
the random or irregular forces. In the decade follow-
ing the World War our balance of trade was subject
to conditions which were not only radically different
from those prevailing before the conflict, but also
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decidedly abnormal in the sense that there is little
or no possibility of their continuing and constituting
a state of equilibrium, even of the moving variety.
The sudden reversal of our position from a large
debtor nation to a creditor nation, closely rivalling
Great Britain, created a situation such that an export
balance of commodities, to which our economy is
accustomed and geared, was sustained only by con-
tinued and large exportation of capital funds, largely
on what may fairly be called a distress basis. Europe
was not borrowing on the normal basis of increasing
productivity in an economy sound and solvent to
start with, which could therefore make its borrowing
self-sustaining with no ill effects.
This condition could not, in the nature of the
case, go on indefinitely. Either foreign borrowing
power would become exhausted or the amounts due
us on interest account would pile up to a point at
which our export balance of goods would be cut
down, and ultimately be turned into an import bal-
ance. In fact, a sharp break was brought about as a
result of our own exaggerated stock market boom,
which attracted funds into our stock market both
from this country and from abroad. This weakened
the financial structure abroad, already working on
too slim a gold margin; and brought into the fore-
ground the disturbing fact that foreign countries
owed amounts on short time which, if called in,
could not be paid and could wreck their financial
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structures completely. While this was the more seri-
ous effect, a more immediate one was the cutting
down of our exports of goods. This movement oc-
curred prior to the decline of imports and of business
in general; and this order of sequence was unusual,
since our imports usually move more sharply than
exports in response to our domestic state of expan-
sion or recession. This initiatory decline of exports
must be reckoned a special contributing factor in
the present depression.
Timing: Banking
In the field of banking, clearings and the volume
of deposits show a lead in the average cycle pattern,
as is natural in view of the large part the stock market
plays in the demand for credit and in the volume of
payments in large clearing centers. Interest rates, on
the other hand, tend to lag, especially at the down-
turn of the general business cycle. It is perhaps sig-
nificant that loans and discounts in general show a
lead as compared with interest rates. One conclusion
that may be drawn is that interest rates are more a
passive than an active or originating factor, though
it is pertinent to add that high interest rates at the
peak and just after may have some effect in starting
trade downward, while easy money in the early stages
of a revival may be an important facilitating cause.
In the last cycle, the timing was different from
this general type. Interest rates led general business
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slightlyon the 19*7-28 up-turn and on the 1929
down-turn, while loans and discounts showed no
lead on the up-turn and lagged on the down-turn.
Thus interest rates in this case led loans and dis-
counts. The fact that they were declining sharply
before the peak of the stock market boom indicates
that the repressive force of the credit system was re-
laxed rather than tightened at the point where ex-
pansion was becoming critical. Funds from non-
banking sources were pouring into the call-loan
market in ways which the bankers felt themselves
unable to control.
Corporate Incomes
Net earnings of corporations are available for five
cycles, not counting that beginning in 1928, but two
are disturbed by the War and the immediate post-
War deflation. Of these, the cycle of 1914-19shows
a rise in net earnings throughout the course of the
general business cycle, while that of 1919-21showsa
decline throughout, both for the totals and for most
of the separate industrial groups. Of the other three
cycles, all exhibit quite normal behavior, except that
in one case—ini912—thisseries lags behind the
down-turn of general business. Corporate incomes
fluctuate with the general business cycle, but much
more intensely, the slump from the peak of 1929
beingespecially cataclysmic. All this is natural and
well known. The chief peculiarity of the post-War
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period is revealed in the record of the construction
industry, where corporate incomes showed an unin-
terrupted rise through the two cycles 192 1-24 and
1924-27, and then declined almost throughout the
succeeding cycle. In other words, this industry, as
we have already seen, rolled three cycles into one,
with a length of ten years or more. The non-avail-
ability of monthly figures of corporate incomes is
undoubtedly responsible for the fact that they do
not show the short-cycle movements which appear
as slight interruptions of this long-cycle swing in the
figures for contracts awarded.
The behavior during the War period serves to in-
dicate that corporate incomes are affected by price
movements as well as by the fluctuations of trade
activity: that is, by those larger price movements
which go beyond the very moderate cyclical ups and
downs. The latter amount to about ten per cent on
the average. The up-swing of prices from 1919to
1920broughtno corresponding rise in corporate in-
comes, possibly in part because of an unusually large
rise in wages.
Dividend and interest disbursements, as is well
known, are far steadier than corporate incomes, sur-
plus and undivided profits being so used as to act as
equalizers. Of the last thirteen general business cy-
cles (omitting that beginning in 1928) four do not
appear at all in the dividend records, indicating that
reserves are sufficient to iron out minor depressions
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completely.Dividends show a marked cyclical lag
(as might be expected) and also a strong up-trend.
In the last depression they actually increased for a
short time after the general business curve had
started downward, and maintained themselves for
well over half a year before the depletion of reserves
forced them to follow the general downward swing.
While these figures may not be highly accurate, the
character of the story they tell is so strongly marked
that it can hardly fail to reflect the general run of
the facts.
General Conclusions as to Timing of Series
Some general conclusions may at least tentatively
be drawn from the timing of the various series. Some
of the apparently conflicting tendencies may be
partly reconciled by the proposition that, as between
goods of similar durability, consumers' goods tend
to move more promptly. But as between long-lived
and perishable goods, the long-lived goods appear to
take the lead. Construction, especially residential
construction, shows a great lead. Automobiles, espe-
cially passenger cars, show a lead. Production of con-
sumers' goods appears to move ahead of sales for
consumption, and there are some indications that
wholesale trade leads retail. Thus there is some
ground for a tentative conclusion that, as between
the same goods at successive stages of production and
distribution, the stages farther removed from con-
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sumption show the prompter movements. This
proposition, however, is not to be regarded as defin-
itively established. Movements in purchases for
consumption are, in the nature of the case, a domi-
nant force; but we have seen that even if impulses
originate here, the relation between consumers'
purchases and the production of goods is such that
the resulting movements in the production of goods
to meet the purchases may behave in the way de-
scribed as 'leading', the effect appearing to precede
the cause. But this productive activity also governs
consumers' incomes, becoming in turn a cause re-
turning on itself with intensifying force. The actual
expansions and contractions of consumers' purchases
are largely results of changes in productive activity.
Another indication is that bank rates are acted
upon more than acting, with a possible exception in
the last cycle. Movements in volume of bank credit
initiate the conditions bringing about changes in the
rates. These movements in volume of credit may at
times act as initiating forces, as when idle funds
tend to stimulate the markets for securities, but it
is not so clear that they act in this way directly on
the actual work of producing and selling commodi-
ties. Here the volume of credit seems to respond in
the main to the demands of the volume of trade.
It is an important enabling cause or condition, but
hardly an initiating one in the typical case. And ex-
perience points to the conclusion that the power of
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bankrates, and indeed of other banking weapons of
control, is rather limited in face of the large task of
stimulating business when it is depressed, or repress-
ing it when it is stimulated.
Some still more general points may be noted.
Physical production series of the more general sort
show a very widespread tendency to a short lead on
the up-turn of the general business cycle, with a very
slight rise toward the end of the cycle.
Series for prices and sales show only slight and
spasmodic traces of this feature, except for com-
modities already noted as having a special tendency
to lead. And series representing incomes, payrolls
and dividend and interest disbursements do not show
it at all. Whatever the impulse to revival in the gen-
eral economic field, it seems to appear earliest in
physical production.
Further development of some of these points may
wait until we have examined the evidence that may
be drawn from the amplitudes of the fluctuations, as
distinct from their timing.
Amplitudes of Fluctuations: Production
In production three groups stand out: construc-
tion and related industries, automobiles and pro-
ducers' goods in general. In these three groups are
to be found the great bulk of the fluctuations in
production that are above the average in amplitude.
Professor Mitchell has estimated that about one-
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sixth of our normal national income goes into the
production of producers' goods (capital equipment
and non-residential construction, including public
works). The addition of residential housing con-
struction and automobiles would bring the fraction
up to the neighborhood of one-fourth.
The average cyclical fluctuations of these series as
a group can best be judged from their behavior dur-
ing different stages of the 'reference cycle' or gen-
eral business cycle, since in some of these branches
of production their own individual cycles show con-
siderable irregularities of timing. On this basis they
consistently show fluctuations well above the aver-
age for all branches of production, and they contain
among them (along with closely related series) sub-
stantially all the production series that show such
exceptionally large fluctuations. This last fact, to-
gether with the further fact that these series contain
some of those most consistent in their timing, tends
to the conclusion that the aggregate impact of the
fluctuations of these groups is of peculiar weight and
importance. Indeed, if one adds its secondary and
tertiary effects, ramifying through the business sys-
tem, it may well dominate the general movement.
Accurate measurement of the aggregate fluctua-
tions of this group of series would require the con-
struction of special indices for the purpose. Such
analysis as the present writer has been able to make,
using the existing series, leads to the conclusion that
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the aggregate fluctuations of this group, conserva-
tively estimated, are certainly not less than 30 per
cent on the average of the upward and downward
movement.'2 This in itself would account for a fluc-
tuation of 6 to 7 per cent in the national dividend,
in commodity terms; without taking account of its
secondary reactions on the production of other types
of goods.
In striking contrast to these large disturbances are
the very moderate fluctuations in the physical vol-
ume of retail trade. Copeland's index of retail trade
for the three cycles 1919-27,deflatedby a cost-of-
living index number, indicates fluctuations of ap-
proximately 7 per cent, 5 per cent and virtually zero,
or an average of a little over 4 per cent. As indicated
by Dr. Kuznets' study13, the physical volume off
wholesale trade probably fluctuates more than this.
In view of the pitfalls involved in measuring physi-
cal production by deflated dollar values, no great
importance should be attached to these precise fig-
ures; but the general range of magnitudes they indi-
cate is clear. Production of producers' goods fluctu-
ates vastly more than retail trade.
But when we turn to the estimates of physical
volume of production made by the National Bureau
12 For details of this analysis, see the Appendix at the end of this
volume.
13 Simon Kuznets, Cyclical Fluctuations: Retail and Wholesale Trade,
United States, 1919-25(NewYork, Adelphi, 1926).
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of Economic Research, classified into consumers'
goods: durable, semi-durable and non-durable; and
producers' goods: capital equipment, durable goods
and non-durable goods, we find that the intensity of
cyclical fluctuations apparently depends not so much
on whether the goods are for consumers or for pro-
ducers, as upon their durability. The figures cover
the period 1922-29,by whole years. While they are
not comparable with the more elaborately analyzed
cyclical series, they show that durable goods in both
major groups, including capital equipment, experi-
enced cyclical fluctuations several times as great as
non-durable and semi-durable goods.
The conclusion that a major part of the respon-
sibility for the business cycle focuses in this group of
industries does not mean, of course, that the im-
pulses responsible for movements necessarily origi-
nate there; for the chain of causes is endless. But if
in any way this group of productive activities could
be regularized, it would seem that the business cycle
would be reduced to proportions that would no
longer constitute a major evil in our economic sys-
tem.
Any attempt to deal with these disturbing ele-
ments must take account of the conditioning factors
of credit and capital funds which furnish the pur-
chasing power to sustain these movements, and of
the corresponding movements of prices for the par-
ticular commodities making up these groups. In
[76TYPICAL CYCLE PATTERNS
general, the movements of volume of security trad-
ing, of prices of securities, and of new securities
issued, are such as would be expected, showing large
positive fluctuations, with volume of security trading
showing a large lead and security prices a smaller
one. Available data on new securities issued indicate
an exceedingly strong cyclical movement. As to
prices of commodities, parallel tables of prices and
of physical volumes of production, made up of iden-
tical commodities, would make possible interesting
comparisons, which would reveal whether prices of
the various types of goods move in harmony with
physical volumes of production. They might also
throw some light on the question whether the move-
ments of prices are obstructed in some instances by
artificial policies of stabilization, and whether prices
are thus stabilized at the cost of allowing a greater -
fluctuationof output than would take place if prices
were allowed to move in a more natural way as de-
mand fluctuates. Competent observers have no doubt
that this has been happening during the recent great
decline in business.
The reasons why the group of products with which
we are dealing shows more violent fluctuations than
the average have already been dealt with. They rest
mainly on the durability of these classes of goods
and secondarily on the fact that wherever the volume
of durable producers' goods increases in response to
an increasing demand from consumers, it requires
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a larger percentage increase in the. immediate flow
of production of new producers goods to bring
about a smaller percentage increase in the total
volume of such goods in the hands of those who use
them. For the same reason the current production
of durable producers' goods ordinarily increases by
a larger percentage than the flow of products to the
ultimate consumer. The total effect is summed up
in saying that fluctuations in consumption, or in
consumers' current expenditures, are passed on in
the form of more intense fluctuations in the pro-
ducers' expenditures on the durable means of grati-
fying these consumers demands; and even changes
in the rate of growth of consumption may bring
about positive ups and downs in the resulting ex-
penditures of producers. Since each expenditure
constitutes someone else's income, the result is a
widespread fluctuation of incomes and a correspond-
ing fluctuation in consumers' subsequent expenses.
Thus slight disturbances are self-multiplying.
On the side of the supply of funds to finance the
expansion of producers' goods, there is the proba-
bility—which may be taken as a moral certainty—
that as the national income increases in the up-swing
of the business cycle, consumers' expenditures in-
crease less rapidly than the total income, and savings
available for expenditures on producers' goods (or
for advances on the making of durable consumers
goods) increase more rapidly. But the most decisive
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factor on the side of purchasing power is the elas-
ticity of the credit system, since it makes possible
increased expenditures for producers' goods without
correspondingly limited outlays for -consumption--
in short, an increase in total expenditures not limited
to income derived from previous production. When
credit contracts, the opposite effect is produced. The
importance of this factor cannot be overestimated
as an essential link in the chain of causes bringing
about cyclical expansions and contractions of gen-
eral business.
Thus the intensified fluctuations in these groups
of goods are susceptible of rational explanatiôfi. And
this machinery of intensification may be regarded as
one of the primary causes of the character of the
typical business cycle.
Amplitudes of Fluctuations: Incomes
Contributory to this whole situation is the fact
that wages and salaries fluctuate less than the total
national income, and profits more. Thus in a time
of great activity, wages and salaries constitute a
smaller fraction of the increased national income
than in a time of depression. And while an increased
part of the profits is put into reserves in prosperous
times, even this is not hoarded as cash, but is in-
vested—in equipment, inventory or securities. It con-
stitutes a part of the disproportionate flow of social
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income, into producers' goods which takes place in
the period of prosperity.
These reserves furnish a margin which makes pos-
sible the stabilization of dividends, and their inten-
sified fluctuations constitute the reverse side of the
stable-dividend policy. And itis evident that the
result is not to stabilize total purchasing power, but
rather to concentrate the fluctuations on the kinds
of things corporate surpluses are spent on, or in-
vested in. In the first instance, the income distributed
to consumers in the form of dividends is stabilized;
but, as we have seen, the unstabilized activity in the
creation of producers' goods results in violent ups
and downs in the incomes of a quite different group
of consumers. So the total of consumers' income in
the nation still fluctuates. And the total flow of
purchasing power into goods of all sorts may con-
ceivably fluctuate quite as much as if there were no
such attempt at stabilizing that part which flows
through the channel of dividend payments.
These are factors the relative amplitudes of whose
fluctuations would tell us far more than we now
know, if only we could measure them with sufficient
comprehensiveness and precision. Do consumers'
penditures fluctuate more or less than personal in-
comes? Do savings and expenditures for producers'
goods follow a parallel course, or are there important
discrepancies? Do savings exceed expenditures for
producers' goods during recession and depression,TYPICAL CYCLE PATTERNS
and do expenditures for producers' goods exceed
savings during expansion and prosperity? To these
questions no exact statistical answer can be given.
En the first place, production of goods fluctuates
more than incomes disbursed to individuals. This
class of income (estimated by years only) appears to
fluctuate approximately as much asretailsales,
though the lack of monthly figures of income makes
a close comparison impossible. However, there is
a priori reason for believing that consumers' expen-
ditures on the whole fluctuate slightly less than per-
sonal incomes and that savings fluctuate more, while
expenditures on capital fluctuate more than savings,
and total expenditures of all sorts fluctuate more
than income. This last proposition is supported by
the way in which credit expands in boom times,
indicating an increase of actively used purchasing
power in excess of income. But the question is com-
plicated by the ambiguous character of purely specu-
lative gains, which should probably be reckoned by
themselves as a kind of income separate from that
derived directly from the processes of production.
As to the greater steadiness of consumers' expenses,
the conclusion is supported by the general fact that
the production of consumers' goods fluctuates less
than the comprehensive index which includes both
consumers' and producers' goods, while retail prices
of consumers' goods fluctuate less than the average
of all prices.
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But there are cross-currents and eddies in the
movement. Some with a liberal margin of income
may spend pretty much according to their desires
and let the fluctuations of their income show mainly
in their savings; and others with no margin at all
may be forced to draw down their savings or buy
groceries on credit, or both, as soon as depression
reduces their income. All these are spending more
steadily than they are earning.
At the same time others are accused of hoarding
or are said to be skimping consumption during the
depression and saving to the utmost while they still
have jobs, because they do not know how soon they
may join the ranks of those without incomes. And
others are tempted into bargain hunting in the se-
curity markets. Still others are making the payments
due on goods bought in better times on the install-
ment plan, and making no new installment pur-
chases. These are all spending less steadily than they
are earning, increasing their savings or reducing
their indebtedness at just the time when incomes are
falling off.
There seems little doubt that the main current is
made up of those who spend more steadily than
they earn, and that those who earn more steadily than
they spend constitute an eddy or group of eddies
nOt sufficient to neutralize the main drift. There
may be an initial stage in a depression in which con-
sumers' purchases of postponable goods and luxuriesTYPICAL CYCLE PATTERNS
shrinkmore than their incomes, and this stage may
be important.'4 But once the depression is well under
way, incomes in general shrink more than the pos-
sible amount of these easy economies in luxury buy-
ing. The funds free for investment bargain hunting
are scant, as witnessed by the continued low prices
of securities; and as for hoarding by those who still
fear to lose their jobs, they have little enough money
free for that. Funds free for reducing installment
indebtedness are also necessarily limited. Hence, in
default of fuller and more accurate statistics we may
provisionally assume that consumption (or rather
consumers' current expenditures for consumption
goods) is steadier than personal income.
The statistics further bear out the logical conclu-
sion that this relative steadiness is mostly found in
the realm of necessary and perishable goods. Durable
goods, and moderately durable goods in the luxury
class, show great fluctuations. These are the goods in
which a shrinkage of income causes the heaviest con-
tractions of expenditure. In fact, goods may be di-
vided into two classes: those in which expenditures
are steadier than income and those in which they
14 Dr. IV. I. King considers this the dominant movement, holding
that expenditures fluctuate vastly more than incomes and that this is
the chief 'immediate cause' of business cycles. (Proceedings, American
Statistical Association, March, 1932, espedally pp. 222-4.) It is unfor-
tunate that there is not adequate statistical evidence to test either this
proposition or the other which seems to the present writer more
probable.
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are less steady. The second class includes capital
goods as well as durable consumers' goods and lux-
uries. If all goods were in the first class, business
cycles would be, at most, mild affairs. The conclusion
seems inevitable that the main responsibility centers
in the second class of goods.
They are also(as already noted) the goods in
which a loss of confidence, or a weakening of the
mood of optimism characteristic of a boom period,
may cause a contraction of expenditures even be-
fore incomes have actually begun to decline. To
this extent they may be regarded as active or initi-
ating factors in the movements of general business
activity. Even at this point in the cycle, however,
though some consumers may decrease their pur-
chases of some commodities before their individual
incomes begin to shrink, there is likely to be some
prior shrinkage of production and income in those
branches of business which show the greatest lead
in the average business cycle pattern.
The fact—if it be a fact—that expenditure for
consumption is steadier than production and income
may represent one of the forces setting limits on
the cumulative effects of disturbances, which have
been noted as one of the central causes of the cycli-
cal behavior of business. If every reduction of pro-
ductiveactivityat any point caused an equal
reduction of expenditures, diffused throughout the
economic system, resulting in a further reduction of
[84TYPICAL CYCLE PATTERNS
productionand so on, there would be no logically
assignable limits to the lengths to which such con-
traction could go, short of a breaking-away from the
profit system and a shift to one of self-sufficing pro-
duction or barter.Itis significant, indeed, that
precisely this has happened, locally and on a small
scale, in the present emergency.
But if a reduction of production, and of income,
is followed by a smaller reduction of expenditures,
then the series of derived effects is a dwindling series
of the type which should have a finite, not an infinite
sum. If, for instance, a contraction of production
were followed by a contraction of expenditures only'
one-half as great, then the sum of an infinite series
of such reductions would result only in doubling
the amount of the original contraction. And if we
imagine business at any moment suffering from the
first phase of one original contraction, plus the sec-
ond phase of an earlier one, plus the third phase of
a still earlier one, and so on, the result would be
the same: the original contraction would be doubled
and no more. Or if the derived contractions were
three-fourths of the original ones, the total effect
would be larger, but still limited. What probably
happens is that the fraction representing the dwin-
dling of the derived effects is variable from one phase
of the cycle to another.'5
15Sincewriting the above, my attention has been called by Mr. M. C.
Rorty to a paper by R. F. Kahn entitled "Public Works and Inflation",
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This same feature of the greater steadiness of
expenditures as compared with incomes plays an
important part in Dr. Warren M. Persons' theory
as one of the forces tending to bring depression to
an end, and initiate the resumption of activity.16
Excess inventories are reduced by the purchases of
consumers who are drawing on their savings or
credit, with the result that purchases by dealers
revive.
Itisobviously a necessary condition of this
process that excess inventories should be cleared
before these consumers' savings, or their credit re-
sources, are exhausted. And it seems quite possible
that if the depression, with its cutting down of in-
comes and its frozen inventories, is unusually severe,
the savings and credit resources may be exhausted
first. If this should happen, it seems only natural
that the depression would fail to be checked in the
usual time, but would go on into a deeper and more
prolonged phase, waiting the coming of other forces
of revival. In such an event, the strain might be
Journal of American Statistical Association, Supplement, March, 1935,
whichapplies the idea of a dwindling series of finite sum to the sec-
ondary effects of a public-works program, taking account of various
elements responsible for the 'leakage'. He estimates the additional
secondary or induced expansion of employment, for Great Britain, on
various bases, at 3/i,1 and2timesthe number directly employed. For
the United States he considers the induced employment would be
larger.
16SeeForecasting Business Cycles (New York, wiley, 193 t),Chapter
II, especially pp. 22-5.
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said to have exceeded the limits of the normal elas-
ticity of the business structure and become a thing
of a different sort—as indeed seems to be the case
today. When this happens, revival may wait for some
other force of recovery—perhaps for a slower process
whereby the shrunken volume of savings of the rela-
tively well-to-do, exceeding the still-more-shrunken
volume of capital expenditures, finally produces an
upward turn in the securities markets. This may
revive confidence and lead to increased expenditures
by producers and consumers alike. Or recovery may
wait upon some outside originating force or forces
of a favorable nature.
Another factor which must not be forgotten in
seeking for causes of the cumulative expansions and
contractions, as well as of the limits set upon them,
is the elasticity of credit. Aswe have seen, it is mainly
this factor which makes it possible for total expendi-
tures to move independently of total incomes pre-
viously received, and thus to initiate and strengthen
these cumulative movements. Expansion of credit
makes it possible for expenditures to increase be-
yond incomes already realized, and so to lead to an
increase of production, leading in turn to a subse-
quent increase of incomes. This is clearly very dif-
ferent from what could happen if the expenditures
which limit production were themselves limited to
income derived from prior production. Limits on
the expansion of credit presumably bear a share of
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responsibility for setting limits on the resulting in-
dustrial expansion. And contraction of credit means
that expenditures are smaller than incomes already
realized, with the result that subsequent incomes
are smaller. In this case, while the contraction of
credit may to some extent be the moving cause of
the contraction in expenditures,itseems more
likely to be a result, taking up the slack as expendi-
tures shrink. This is partly borne out by the fact
that bank credit frequently shows no absolute con-
traction in a business recession.
Statistics seem to afford no way of testing the
causal importance of this element. As an enabling
cause of rapid expansion, if other forces are work-
ing in that direction, it appears to be of vital im-
portance: an essential element. But as an independ-
erit moving factor, the writer is inclined to assign
it mainly a contributory influence, only occasion-
ally rising tofirst-ratesignificance. Easy money
enables people to obey the impulse to buy more
goods and securities, but does not seem likely in
most instances to furnish the moving impulse if
there are no other circumstances tending to create it.
The business cycle is a vicious circle with no be-
ginning this side of the origin of capitalistic produc-
tion and no end until a way is found of breaking
into the circle at some point and controlling its
hitherto-endless sequence. Perhaps the chief reason
for not regarding consumers' expenditures as con-
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stitutingthe factor of most strategic importance is
that they do not seem to afford the most promising
point for breaking into the circle with measures of
control. Consumers' income is a more promising
lever to work with, but even here crude efforts
might easily neutralize themselves or worse.
Amplitudes of Fluctuations: Prices
One of the well-known discrepancies in the busi-
ness cycle is constituted by the greater fluctuations
in wholesale prices than in retail prices or costs of
living. Is this of important causal significance? Does
it, for instance, bring about automatically a discrep-
ancy between production and purchasing power
such as many theorists take to be the central cause
of the whole phenomenon? The fact might be urged
that during a recession this discrepancy in price
movements brings about a shrinkage in the money
incomes derived from the earlier stages of produc-
tion, while the prices that have to be paid when
these incomes are spent for consumers' goods show
no corresponding shrinkage. Thus the purchasing
power of incomes is automatically reduced.11 The
reverse happens during business expansion. It ap-
pears that the effect of this discrepancy in price
movements is disturbing.
The causal problem remains untouched. What
17Incomein this case must probably be taken to include individual
business profits.
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causes the decline in wholesale prices at the begin-
fling of a depression, or what causes the previous
rise? Furthermore, this series of movements cannot
be realistically discussed apart from the movements
in volume of trade which go with them. Prices de-
cline because demand has weakened; and weakening
demand commonly manifests itself first in a falling-
off in volume of sales. This falling-off in sales is com-
monly a proximate cause of the decline in prices.
It is also one of the keys to understanding the
effects of the price-deflation. It operates in conjunc-
tion with losses due to depreciation of inventories
bought at earlier and higher prices; and serves to
aggravate this element by forcing dealers to hold
their inventories longer. Another element is the
fact that many wholesale deliveries are made, not
at current market prices but at prices fixed in earlier
contracts. Thus, when the wholesale market falls,
the average price gdverning actual transfers of goods
does not fall as far or as promptly as the open-market
price. No one of these factors would perhaps be
sufficient to answer the question why dealers do not
make profits instead of losses when the wholesale
prices they have to pay decline so very much more
than the retail prices they receive. Taken all to-
gether, however, they suffice to explain the outcome.
The discrepancy between the movements of
wholesale and retail prices is a result and symptom
of the fact that the depression strikes hardest at the
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points farther removed from the ultimate consumer;
and it becomes, of course, part of the mechanism
by which the effects are transmitted and their in-
cidence apportioned among different groups. But it
is hardly in itself an initiating cause.
Amplitudes of Fluctuations: Profits
The intensified fluctuations of profits constitute
another obvious and significant factor, closely related
to the movements of prices. The traditional function
of profits and losses is to direct economic resources
into the creation of the goods that are most in de-
mand, and to bring about the absorption of business
by the most competent producers and the weeding-
out of the incompetent. A marked increase of profits
over the entire business field is, from this standpoint,
a curious phenomenon, seeming to imply that com-
modities in general are more in demand than before,
or that the supply is short. As human needs remain
about the same from prosperity to depression, and
as the general increase in prices and profits occurs at
precisely the times when goods are plentiful rather
than scarce, this curiosity gains the character of an
anomaly. High prices and high profits are an index,
not of general scarcity but of general plenty. They
serve to urge the producer to increase his production
to the utmost at precisely the time when he is already
turning out more than can, in the nature of the case,
be continuously absorbed. It seems evident that the
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function of profits is suffering some sort of a perver-
sion, and that this is one of the central and strate-
gically important factors in the business cycle.
One cause of such a perversion is to be found in
the movements of prices, together with movements
of costs which do not keep pace. Interest burdens
are fixed by contracts, many of which run for long
terms of years, while even on the shorter ones the
rates of interest do not rise and fall sufficiently to
compensate for the effect of changing prices. Wage
rates are also sluggish in their responses—earnings,
of course, move with the volume of employment.
Furthermore, since much indirect labor is of a char-
acter that does not vary proportionately with fluctua-
tions of output, an increase of production carries
with it a less than proportionate increase in the
number of labor-hours necessary to turn itout.
Hence an increase of output, if not neutralized by
an actual fall in prices, has of itself the effect of in-
creasing profits; and this is precisely the signal which
business is accustomed to interpret as a sign that
conditions are such as to justify further expansion.
Thus profits fall in the class of cumulative, rather
than self-limiting, forces; and this fact tends to de-
stroy their value as a governor of general business
expansion. If an expansion is indicated, and business
responds to the signal, the signal does not grow
weaker as the presumed need is met, but stronger.
This is not the place to attempt to elaborate pro-
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posals for dealing with these matters; we seek merely
to establish the practical and strategic importance
of this set of causal factors by showing that they can
be reached by things men can do to modify their
action. Something can be done about them. More-
over, in devising policies it is essential to distinguish
sharply between the 'internal economies' of full
utilization, which depend on the principles of over-
head costs and not on changes in the market rates
of wages or prices of materials, and the external
forces arising in the general market. It is probably
useful to have producers under a spur to operate
their individual plants at full capacity in order to
derive the economies of full operation. An economy
where plants operate reasonably close to capacity is
not necessarily an economy in which markets are
chronically glutted. This incentive to full operation
may be so handled, it is true, as to work towards
increased instability; but probably it can also be so
conditioned as to work towards greater stability.
Business men may simply regard the peak periods
as their sources of greatest profits, and subordinate
other things to the attempt to do as large a volume
of business as possible at those times, living through
the dull periods as best they can. This attitude tends
to perpetuate instability. A truer reckoning would
indicate that the burden of idle overhead through
the dull periods is chargeable to the peak business
as a cost of standing ready to handle it when it comes;
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and this burden makes the peak business very ex-
pensive, even casts some doubt on its real profitable-
ness. When this is realized, the business interest in
stabilization becomes clear.
But this interest is still not fully reflected in the
methods of accounting appropriate to separate enter-
prises. This is chiefly because individual businesses
may also shift a considerable burden of idle over-
head to other businesses by curtailing their pur-
chases. The cost of goods and materials is a direct
and variable cost to them, but it contains a large
element of overhead cost for the businesses which
make the goods and materials. A consolidated in-
come account for business as a whole would have
a larger proportion of constant or overhead costs
than do the separate accounts of the individual busi-
nesses, and when business thinks in terms of its for-
tunes as a whole it will have a correspondingly
greater interest in stabilization than is apparent on
the surface of the ordinary methods of cost reckon-
ing.18
Thus the fact that the profits of a business show
an intensified increase in response to an increase in
the output of that business constitutes a force which
may work toward stability or toward instability. The
outcome depends on whether business thinks and
acts in old-fashioned individualistic terms or in terms
18 The writer has dealt with this question at more length in his
volume, The Economics of Overhead Costs.
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ofits long-run and collective interests. But there
seems to be no ambiguity as to the effect of a condi-
tion in which the market behaves in such a way as
to increase one producer's profits by reason of the
fact that all the other producers are expanding their
operations. This almost certainly makes for insta-
bility and cumulative intensification of movements.
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